



Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 







Ramin Dadasov and Oliver Lorz 
 
 


















This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 







Göttingen  MAGKS Mode of International Investment and
Endogenous Risk of Expropriation




In this paper, we develop a politico-economic model to analyze the
relationship between the mode of international investment and insti-
tutional quality in a non-democratic capital importing country. For-
eign investors from a capital-rich North can either purchase productive
assets in a capital-poor South and transfer their capital within inte-
grated multinational rms or they can form joint ventures with local
asset owners. The South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use
its political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture,
the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation, whereas in
an integrated rm, this risk aects the foreign investor. This eect
lowers the incentives for specic investments in an integrated rm and
distorts the decision between joint ventures and integrated production.
By setting the institutional framework in the host country, the elite
inuences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk
of expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of inter-
national production. We also analyze as to how globalization, which
is reected in a decline in investment costs, inuences institutional
quality.
JEL classication: F21, L22, P48
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, joint venture, property rights,
expropriation
Address: RWTH Aachen University, Department of Economics and Business Ad-
ministration, Templergraben 64, 52056 Aachen, Germany. Email: ramin.dadasov@rwth-
aachen.de, lorz@rwth-aachen.de.1 Introduction
Recent literature on the organization of international rms has emphasized
the role of property rights in a world with incomplete contracts and oppor-
tunistic behavior. The key insight from the property rights approach is that
ownership matters as it improves the incentives to undertake specic invest-
ments. In a joint relationship that is characterized by incomplete contracts
and hold-up, ownership of a production asset entails a better outside option
and thereby raises the bargaining power when it comes to surplus sharing.1
Considering a property rights model with heterogeneous rms and two in-
puts, one owned by a rm in the North and one by a rm in the South, Antras
and Helpman (2004) show that, depending on their productivity, rms choose
dierent modes of international production. Low-productivity rms stay in
the North, rms with an intermediate productivity outsource to the South,
whereas high-productivity rms choose integrated production in the form
of foreign direct investments. The mode of international production also de-
pends on the relative importance of the specic inputs supplied by rms from
the North.
The property rights mechanism can only work adequately if asset owners
are protected against interventions by third parties, most notably the govern-
ment of the host country. However, many countries in the South are plagued
by insucient institutions, poorly protected property rights, and sizable ex-
propriation risks. For example, the average scores of Sub-Saharan Africa and
Central Asia in the Legal and Political Environment Index of the Interna-
tional Property Rights Index Report stand out as lowest in comparison with
other regions in the world.2 Notably, a large part of the countries with weak
economic institutions can be characterized as non-democratic. According
to a study by Li (2010), more than four of ve expropriatory acts towards
foreign investors occur in autocratic regimes.3
1The property rights literature builds on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). For applications to the case of international rms,
see, in particular, Antras (2003, 2005) and Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008). Levchenko
(2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) employ the approach to explain how the quality of
institutions may aect international trade patterns. Nunn (2007) and Nicolini (2007)
nd empirical evidence on the importance of the contractual environment for oshoring
decisions of multinational rms.
2The Legal and Political Environment Index consists of four sub-components, namely
judicial independence, rule of law, political stability, and control of corruption (see
Strokova, 2010). A similar picture emerges from the Investment Prole Index of the
International Country Risk Guide, which captures a broader measure of expropriation
risks.
3In addition, Jensen (2008) shows that the political risk for multinational investors in
1Ownership provides far weaker residual control rights and investment
incentives in countries with weakly protected property rights compared to
other locations with better institutions. Obviously, this has consequences
for the organizational form of international production. The institutional
quality in a country, in turn, is not exogenously given. Instead, as has been
argued by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and Acemoglu et al. (2005),
the quality of domestic institutions is the outcome of a political process.
To elaborate the mutual relationship between institutional quality and the
activities of international investors, we integrate the property rights approach
into a politico-economic model that endogenizes institutional quality. In line
with the prevalence of non-democratic regimes mentioned above, our model
considers a setting in which the political power rests with a small elite in the
society.4
Our model considers a small capital importing economy in the South with
heterogeneous local producers. Each producer owns a specic asset whose
exogenous productivity diers between agents. To start up production, a
producer needs foreign capital that is provided by potential investors of the
North. Producer and investor may choose between two organizational forms
to transfer capital and to produce in the South: The rst arrangement is
integrated production or foreign direct investment, i.e., the investor purchases
the asset in the South and transfers capital internally within the resulting
multinational rm. Second, both partners may form a joint venture in which
ownership of the local asset rests with the producer in the South.
The ruling elite in the capital importing country in the South determines
the institutional framework under which production can take place. Specif-
ically, we assume that the elite sets the institutional quality which in turn
determines the expropriation risk, i.e., the degree to which property rights
are protected in the country. We assume that only the local asset can be
expropriated, but not foreign capital.5 In a joint venture, the domestic agent
bears the risk of expropriation, whereas this risk is directed towards the for-
eign investor in the case of an integrated rm. As a consequence, the risk
of losing the local asset due to expropriation lowers the incentive to invest
non-democratic regimes exceeds the risk in democratic countries. Autocracies are concen-
trated in Central Asia and Africa: More than half of the world's authoritarian regimes
can be found there (see EIU, 2008).
4See Bourguignon and Verdier (2005); Albornoz et al. (2008); Myerson (2010); Ra-
jan and Zingales (2003); Dadasov et al. (2010) for dierent approaches to analyze the
interaction between nancial integration and institutional quality.
5Hajzler (2010) documents the distribution of expropriation acts between dierent sec-
tors across countries. Between 1990 and 2006, 40 % o all expropriation acts occurred in
the primary sector. These cases of expropriation in the primary sector may be seen as
typical examples for an expropriation of local assets by the government.
2capital in the integrated rm, which makes integration less attractive as an
organizational form. As foreign investors provide less capital in a joint ven-
ture than in an integrated rm, the expropriation risk not only lowers capital
transfers at the intensive margin (i.e., within a single integrated rm) but
also at the extensive margin (by lowering the number of integrated rms) {
even though foreign capital cannot be expropriated. These results nd empir-
ical support in the literature: According to Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), US
multinationals are more likely to choose complete ownership for their foreign
investment projects if the country risk of expropriation declines. Similarly,
Henisz (2000) shows empirically that political hazards, which cover regula-
tion policies as well as outright expropriation, decrease the probability of
choosing majority-owned plants relative to minority owned joint ventures.6
In addition, substantial empirical evidence shows that the risk of expropria-
tion inuences international capital inows or the volume of FDI.7
By determining the quality of domestic institutions, the elite faces a trade-
o: On the one hand, weakening the protection of property rights raises the
expected output share that the elite can appropriate. On the other hand,
it distorts international capital ows and thereby lowers the output level.
From this trade-o, we can derive the equilibrium expropriation risk and its
determinants. In particular, we are interested in the eects of economic inte-
gration on the institutional quality in the South. Interpreting globalization
as a change in investments costs, we show that a decline in the xed costs
of setting up an integrated rm lowers the risk of expropriation, whereas a
decline in the xed costs of a joint venture raises it. A change in the marginal
costs of capital investments, in turn, does not inuence the equilibrium risk
of expropriation. Here, two opposing eects exactly oset each other: On
the one hand, the elite is induced to extract more rents, but on the other
hand, the expropriation become more distortionary. Finally, we extend our
analysis allowing additionally for the expropriation of foreign capital. In this
case, the distortionary eects of the expropriation risk are stronger than in
our baseline model, which amplies the distortion of investment incentives.
Our paper is related to other contributions on the relationship between
the mode of international investments and institutional quality. According
6Building on these results, Henisz (2000) also analyzes the interplay between political
and contractual hazards in determining the ownership structure. The ndings of Javorcik
and Wei (2009) and Straub (2008), who show that an increase in corruption shifts the
ownership structure from FDI towards joint ventures, may also be interpreted as lending
indirect support for our theoretical results. Bloom et al. (2009) show that trust and the
rule of law promote a decentralization of rms.
7See, e.g., Alfaro et al. (2008); Asiedu et al. (2009); Busse and Hefeker (2007); Gas-
tanaga et al. (1998); Papaioannou (2009).
3to Che and Facchini (2009), a multinational company can choose between
three dierent strategies to enter a market, depending on the allocation of
authority within an organization: licensing agreements, joint ventures and
wholly owned subsidiaries. The decision on the mode of entry depends on
the multinational's knowledge of the local market and on the exogenous risk
of being expropriated by the local partner. In this framework, the relation-
ship between the optimal entry strategy and the institutional environment
is non-monotonic. Straub (2008) considers a foreign rm that can either
sell its superior technology to a developing country or make a greeneld in-
vestment. Expropriation may occur in the form of a default, i.e., the local
government refuses to pay the price for the technology. In this setting, FDIs
are preferred over debt nancing in the presence of political risk. Asiedu
and Esfahani (2001) develop a theoretical model that builds on the transac-
tion cost approach to explain the determinants of ownership in international
investments. The risk of expropriation, enters their model only indirectly,
as it is assumed to inuence the comparative advantage of the local partner
in the joint project. Finally, several papers analyze expropriation of foreign
investors in the resource extraction sector. For example, Guriev et al. (2009)
set up a dynamic framework to explain the fact that expropriations in the
oil industry are more likely to occur in periods with a high oil price. They
also show empirically that the expropriation risk is higher in countries with
weak political institutions.8
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy in the South that is populated by a ruling
elite and a continuum of heterogeneous local producers with unit mass. Each
producer owns a specic asset, for example, a production plant or access to
natural resources. The utilization of this asset requires the xed input of
specic skills by the producer, such that asset and skills jointly produce a
local intermediate input A. The productivity of this input diers between
producers, which we model by assuming that A is distributed according to
the cumulative distribution function G(A) over [0;1). The local input can
be used productively only in combination with capital K according to the
8Similarly, Bohn and Deacon (2000) nd a strong negative eect of the ownership
risk on investments in resource extraction. Hajzler (2010) argues that a country with
weak property rights protection may oset the expropriation risk for foreign investors by








The economy under consideration does not own any domestic capital and
therefore has to rely on foreign capital imports from the North for production.
Output y is sold on the world market for a given price of one.
Building on Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), we
consider a relationship between foreign investor and domestic producer that
is subject to a hold-up problem. Both potential partners are not able to
contract upon the level of investments ex ante or on the returns for this
investment. Instead, they bargain about revenue sharing ex post after the
investment decision has been made. Anticipating that the marginal return
on capital will not fully accrue to her, the international investor sets capi-
tal supply to a sub-optimally low level. To mitigate this ineciency, both
partners can transfer ownership of the specic asset from the local producer
to the foreign investor. This improves the bargaining position of the inter-
national investor when it comes to sharing the joint surplus. Consequently,
ownership aects the incentives of the foreign investor to provide capital. If
the foreign investor does not own the asset, she will invest less relative to
the situation in which the property right of the asset rests with her. De-
pending on the ownership structure, we distinguish the following two ideal
organizational forms:
 Disintegrated production (joint venture), i.e., the local producer holds
the property right of the asset
 Integrated production (foreign direct investment), i.e., the foreign in-
vestor acquires the asset from the local producer
In a joint venture, the foreign investor's claim over the joint surplus solely
results from her ownership of the factor capital. With integration, the foreign
investor purchases the local asset and thereby raises her claim. As mentioned
in the introduction, we consider a country with a weak institutional environ-
ment in the sense that property rights are insecure. This lowers the value of
owning the asset and therefore also inuences the choice of the organizational
form of international production.
The institutional quality in the host country is characterized by the pa-
rameter  2 [0;1] that measures the risk of expropriation. The elite of the
host country sets the institutional environment and thereby inuences the
expropriation risk. For example, the elite may determine how clearly prop-
erty rights are dened, under which conditions property may be conscated,
5or to which degree independent courts may review expropriation decisions.
In the context of our paper, expropriation of an asset implies that the ruling
elite, instead of the original owner, can claim a part of the revenue. The
elite chooses the economic institutions to maximize its own income, and this
choice determines the risk of expropriation. A convenient and straightfor-
ward way to incorporate this mechanism into our framework is to assume
that the elite directly controls the probability of expropriation.9 The risk of
expropriation is the same for all asset owners, and it does not depend on the
organizational form of production. We assume, for the time being, that this
is the only form of institutional distortion. Particurarly, it is not possible for
the elite to expropriate foreign capital or the specic skills supplied by the
local producer. The following sequence of events summarizes the structure
of the model:
1. The elite determines  to maximize its own expected income
2. Foreign investors and domestic asset owners choose the organizational
form that maximizes their expected joint payo
3. Foreign investors decide how much K they invest
4. Expropriation of individual assets occurs with probability 
5. Revenues are realized and shared
3 International Investment and Institutional
Quality
To solve the model, we proceed by backward induction, beginning with the
sharing of revenues in the nal stage. Following the property rights approach,
bargaining over dividing the joint surplus takes place both in a joint venture
and under integration.10 This is due to the fact that the foreign investor {
though being the asset owner under integration { is still dependent on the
specic skills of the local producer. To simplify the exposition, we refrain
from explicitly modeling the bargaining game. Instead, we consider exoge-
nous shares of the joint revenue that accrue from ownership of the respective
9See, e.g., Besley and Ghatak (2009) for a similar approach.
10This distinguishes the current set-up from the transaction cost approach according to
which integration completely solves the hold-up problem. For an application of transaction
cost models in the context of the international organization of rms see, e.g., McLaren
(2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002).
6factors of production. In particular, we apply following notation:  denotes
the expected share of the respective asset owner,  is the expected share of
the local producer, which results from his specic skills, and nally  is the
expected share of the capital owner. Note that  +  +  = 1.11
Given this outcome of the revenue sharing stage, the international in-
vestor has to decide on the capital stock she will invest. This decision is
characterized by the equality of the marginal return { either from a joint
venture or from an integrated rm { with her opportunity costs. With a fric-
tionless international capital market, the opportunity costs are given by the
world interest rate R. As mentioned above, the investor expects a revenue
share of  under the joint venture. The investment level in this case can be
derived from maximizing yj  RKj, where the subscript denotes the case of









A  jA (2)
as the investment level in a joint venture.
With integration, the international investor expects a revenue share of +
  and therefore chooses an investment level to maximize ( +    )yi 









A  i()A : (3)
Describing the hold-up problem in the previous section, we have emphasized
the relevance of ownership for the investment decision. The optimal invest-
ment level under integration is higher than in a joint venture since in the rst
case the foreign investor has the control rights over the asset and thereby re-
ceives a larger share of the revenue. This mitigates the hold-up problem
which distorts the investment decision. According to the above equations,
K
i () > K
j for all  2 [0;1). Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to ,
we nd @i=@ < 0. Thus, the investment level in an integrated rm decreases
with the expropriation risk. Figure 1 depicts the investment levels under the
two alternative organizational forms. In a perfect institutional environment
{ i.e., with no risk of expropriation { investments in an integrated rm are
highest. As the institutional quality deteriorates ( increases), investments
decline. Finally, in the limit case of a denite expropriation ( = 1), own-
ership of the asset becomes worthless for the international investor, and she
chooses the same investment level as in a joint venture. The investment level
in a joint venture is not aected by .
11Such payo shares can be derived from applying the Nash-Bargaining Solution in a















Figure 1: Institutional Quality and Investment Incentives









Turning to the choice of organizational form, we assume that the for-
eign investor and the domestic producer jointly choose the mode of foreign
investment that maximizes the expected joint prot from the bilateral rela-
tionship.12 With a joint venture, the domestic producer is expropriated with
probability  and sticks with an output share of  in this case. In case of
non-expropriation, he receives a share of  +  of yj. Expropriation does
not target the foreign investor, who receives a share of . In an integrated
rm, the domestic producer sticks to a share of , whereas the international
investor gets  +  in the case of non-expropriation and  if the asset is
expropriated. As in the work of Antras and Helpman (2004), we assume
that international investments give rise to xed costs that depend on the
organizational form. We denote these xed costs by fi and fj, respectively.
The expected joint prots in a joint venture and in an integrated rm are
respectively given by
E[j] = (1   )yj   RK

j   fj and (5)
E[i] = (1   )yi()   RK

i ()   fi : (6)
12That is, we allow for side payments between the foreign investor and the domestic
producer.
8Because of the xed costs, minimum supply levels of the local input are
required for the dierent modes of production. We now determine these
critical values and thereby obtain the organizational pattern of rms in equi-
librium. The minimum level of A that is needed to establish a joint venture







j(1      )
: (7)
Accordingly, for an integrated rm to be at least as protable as a joint
venture, the following inequality has to hold: E[i]  E[j]. This inequality





(1      )(i()   
j)   i()(1   )
: (8)
Note that for  ! 1, the denominator in (8) approaches zero. Since this
denominator is strictly decreasing in , it is positive for all  2 [0;1), which
implies A











Figure 2 illustrates the cut-o levels, depicting the expected prot levels
(5) and (6) for a given value of . Note that E[i] is steeper in A than
E[j]. The intersection of E[j] with the abscissa determines the minimum
input level A
j. All domestic asset owners, who can provide a lower input
level than A
j, do not take up production and are, therefore, inactive on the
market. The intersection between E[j] and E[i] determines the threshold
input level required for a FDI, A
i. In the range between A
j and A
i it is not
protable to form an integrated rm due to the higher xed costs. Therefore,
this range corresponds to the rms that form joint ventures in the economy.
Finally, expected prots from integration exceed prots from a joint venture
for all productivity values higher than A
i.
The institutional quality of the host country aects the critical cut-o
levels between the dierent organizational forms, as shown by the following
13A
i() > A
j() if (1      )
jfi > [1      ( +    )]i()fj. Since
1     1   ( + ) for all  2 [0;1], we need an assumption that ensures

jfi > i()fj. Using (3) and (2) and taking into account that i() takes the highest
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Exit Integrated Firm
Figure 2: Organizational Structure and Expropriation





















where 	() > 0.14
An increase in  shifts both cut-o levels to the right, with @A
i=@ >
@A
j=@ > 0. That is, an increase in  has a stronger eect on the value of
A
i() than on A
j(). As a result, the mass of integrated rms declines in
 whereas that of joint ventures increases. Furthermore, since the minimum
input level that is necessary for market entry rises, the total mass of active
rms in the host country declines, which raises the average A of the remaining
rms. The intuition behind this result is that an increase in  has two eects:
First, it directly lowers expected joint prots in both organizational forms.
As the size of this eect is proportional to the supplied quantity of the local
input, it has a stronger inuence on A
i() than on A
j(). Second, in an
integrated rm, an increase in  reduces the quantity of capital supplied
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10by the foreign investor, which additionally lowers output and expected joint
prots. The term 	() in (11) captures this eect. To illustrate the distortion
in capital allocation more clearly, we may also examine the eect of a change
in expropriation risk on joint prots. By dierentiating (5) and (6) with
respect to , we obtain
@E[j]
@







(1   )( +    )

yi() < 0 : (13)
Comparing (12) with (13) shows that an increase in the risk of expropriation
reduces joint prots in an integrated rm to a larger extent than in a joint
venture. In addition to a higher direct eect of the expropriation risk, joint
prots in an integrated rm are also lowered by a decline in the capital supply.
Figure 2 demonstrates the inuence of  on the cut-o input levels. An
exogenous increase in  makes the expected income lines atter (illustrated
by the dashed lines), with a larger absolute change in the slope of E[i]. As a
consequence, A
i() increases more strongly than A
j(). Hence, a reallocation
of the organizational structure of rms takes place shifting ownership toward
joint ventures.
The inuence of the expropriation risk on the critical productivities sug-
gests that a deterioration of the institutional quality harms the economy
in the host country. By deriving the eect of a change in  on domestic
production (GDP), we analyze this eect more systematically. GDP { de-


















where g(A) denotes the density of the corresponding distribution function
G(A). From now on, we assume that G(A) follows a Pareto distribution:
G(A) = 1   (b=A)
k, where b denotes the minimum possible value for A, and



















15Since the work by Helpman et al. (2004), the Pareto distribution has been frequently
employed in the literature on trade with heterogeneous rms. The assumption k > 2
ensures a nite variance of A.
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Hence, an increase in the risk of expropriation lowers domestic production.
We now turn to the rst stage of the game and analyze the choice of the
institutional environment by the ruling elite. That is, we determine the level
of  that maximizes the elite's expected income from expropriating the asset




The following rst order condition determines the optimal institutional qual-





= 0 ; (18)
where @Y G()=@ is given by equation (16). Determining the optimal in-
stitutional quality, the elite faces a trade-o: On the one hand, a higher 
delivers a higher expected share of aggregate output for the elite. On the
other hand, it lowers output because of the distortions (i) with respect to the
capital transfer within integrated rms and (ii) with respect to the decision
between a joint venture and an integrated rm.
Inserting (16) into (18) and rearranging yields
(1      k)








(1   )( +    )





= 0 : (19)
The equilibrium probability of expropriation  solves (19). We assume that
the second order condition @2Y E()=@2 < 0 is satised. Inspecting (19)
reveals that  has to satisfy the following necessary condition: 1     
k > 0. This implies that k  1 is a sucient condition to rule out a
conscatory risk of expropriation (where  = 1). Note further that assuming
 = 0 yields @Y E()=@ > 0, such that a zero probability of expropriation
can also be ruled out.
124 Globalization and Institutional Quality
Given the equilibrium probability of expropriation, we now analyze the elite's
reaction to changes in exogenous parameters. In particular, we focus on the
inuence of a better integration of the small country into the world economy.
In this respect, we begin with the eects of a decline in the xed costs of








Whereas a decline in fi results in a lower probability of expropriation, a
decline in fj raises . We can intuitively explain these dierent eects as
follows: For a given institutional quality, a decline in fj lowers the crit-
ical productivity for joint ventures A
j and raises the critical productivity
for an integrated rm A
i. This results in a higher mass of joint ventures.
Since expropriating joint ventures does not distort foreign capital supply, the
elite raises the risk of expropriation such that the institutional environment
changes for the worse. On the contrary, with a decline in fi and therewith
a drop in A
i, the mass of integrated rms increases, such that  declines.
In this case, economic integration improves the institutional quality of the
host country. Moreover, we know from the previous section that a change in
 has a stronger eect on A
i than on A
j. Hence, the decline in the risk of
expropriation results in more integrated rms (i.e., a higher volume of FDI)
and fewer joint ventures. The total mass of active rms increases.




























A better integration of the country into the world economy improves institu-
tional quality in the South only if the xed costs of setting up an integrated
rm decline more strongly (in percentage terms) than the xed costs of a
joint venture. In the opposite case, the countries' institutions change for the
worse, and the risk of expropriation increases. According to (7) and (8), a



























13Hence, for dfi=fi = dfj=fj, the relative decline in both cut-os A
i and Aj
is the same, and, according to (20), the elite does not change institutional
quality. If the relative decline in fi is higher than in fj, however, the mass of
integrated rms increases, and this results in a lower equilibrium expropria-
tion risk.
Globalization may also be reected in a decline in the cost of capital
R. This, however, does not aect the equilibrium expropriation risk, i.e.,
d=dR = 0 (see Appendix). Both threshold productivity levels { A
j and A
i
















Similar to the previous case of a symmetric change in xed costs, the elite
does not adjust the expropriation risk to the new constellation. Its motivation
to extract more rents on the one hand and the larger distortion caused by
the expropriation risk on the other hand balance out, such that  remains
unchanged.
5 Extension: Expropriation of Capital
In our baseline model, expropriation targets only the local asset, such that an
international investor engaged in a joint venture does not bear any political
risk. In this section, we extend our analysis to a setting in which the factor
capital may also be expropriated. For this, we assume that the measure of
institutional quality  describes the expropriation risk for the asset as well
as for capital.
Following the structure of the baseline model, we rst determine the op-
timal investment levels under both organizational forms. In a joint venture,
the international investor expects a revenue share  with the probability 1 .
In case of expropriation, she is left with a revenue share of zero. The optimal









A  ~ j()A : (21)
Accordingly, the expected revenue share of the investor in an integrated rm









A  ~ i()A (22)
14determines the capital input in an integrated rm. As before, the optimal
level of investment under integration is higher than in a joint venture. A
deterioration of the institutional quality now also aects investments in a
joint venture, i.e., @~ j=@ < 0. However, since @~ j=@ > @~ i=@, the distor-
tion in K
i is larger than in K
j for a given A, similar to the baseline model.
Figure 3 illustrates as to how investment incentives are inuenced by the































Figure 3: Expropriation of Capital and Adjusted Investment Incentives
The risk of expropriation now causes a larger distortion than in the baseline
model, as the remaining expected revenue share of the international investor
decreases. In the baseline model, the investor still supplies some capital in
the limit case in which property rights are completely insecure ( = 1). In
the extended framework, however, for the same case, there is no investment








are also lower than in the baseline specication.
To determine the organizational structure of rms, we again formulate
the respective expected joint prots. Naturally, incorporating the risk of
capital expropriation does not inuence the expected output share of the
domestic producer. Taking into account the change in output shares of the
15international investor, the expected joint prots are now given by
E[j] = [1   ( + )]yj()   RK

j()   fj and (24)
E[i] = [1   ( + )]yi()   RK

i ()   fi : (25)
As before, the respective threshold levels of A are obtained by the following











[1   ( + )   (1   )](i()   j())   i()(1   )
:
(27)
Given our parametric assumption in (9), A
i() > A
j() still holds for all
 2 [0;1]. Comparing (7) and (26) reveals that the minimum input level
for taking up production in a joint venture is now higher than in the case
without expropriation of capital. Due to the additional negative impact on
the capital invested in a joint venture, the expected joint prot from this
organizational mode is lower than before. Whether the cut-o for integrated
production A
i in (27) is also higher than its counterpart in (8) is not as clear.
A sucient condition for this to be the case is   1=2.16
The inuence of the risk of expropriation on the critical levels of A can be
inferred from the inuence of  on the expected joint prots. Dierentiating
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 +  +

(1   )(1   )

yi : (29)
As in the baseline model, a higher risk of expropriation lowers expected joint
prots in both organizational forms. As a consequence, both threshold levels
Ai() and Aj() increase in , leading to a lower mass of active rms. In
contrast to our previous results, however, it is now not obvious whether E[i]
declines more strongly than E[j] if the risk of expropriation  increases.
That is, the mass of joint ventures not necessary increases with a rise in the
expropriation rate. On the one hand, the multiplier in (29) is smaller than
the one in (28), but on the other hand, the output level yi exceeds yj. This
16For   1=2 the dierence ~ i()  ~ j() in (27) is not lower than the respective term
in (8).
16ambiguity arises due to the additional distortion in capital supply caused by
the expropriation risk, which now also aects joint ventures. In section 3,
we have pointed out that a rise in  lowers joint prots in an integrated rm
through two dierent channels: It directly reduces the expected joint share
of the output, and it diminishes the level of invested capital. As the wedge
between the marginal productivity and the cost of capital is higher for a joint
venture than for an integrated rm, the latter eect has a relatively stronger
negative impact in a joint venture. In the following, we derive a sucient
condition that guarantees @E[j]=@ > @E[i]=@ 8  2 [0;1]. Using (21),
(22), and (23), the inequality @E[j]=@ > @E[i]=@ holds if
1 +
(1   )








The left hand side of the this inequality is strictly decreasing in , such that












Summarizing, we obtain the following two insights from this extension:
First, the fundamental mechanisms of our baseline model are not aected
by incorporating an additional risk of capital expropriation. Investments
in integrated rms are higher than in joint ventures, and they react more
sensitive to a change in institutional quality. Consequently, an increase in
 results in a lower mass of integrated rms. Second, introducing capital
expropriation also aects investments in joint ventures and amplies the
distortion in investments incentives. Hence, the level of investments and
aggregate payos are lower than that in our baseline specication.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has taken the property rights view of the rm as a starting point
to analyze the relationship between international investments and the insti-
tutional environment in a non-democratic host country. We have considered
a small open economy in which local producers own specic assets and for-
eign investors provide capital for the production of a nal good. In line
with the property rights approach, integration mitigates the hold-up prob-
lem that distorts the incentives to invest capital for production. Political
risks of expropriation, however, distort this mechanism, such that less capi-
tal is invested in each integrated rm and fewer integrated rms are active
17in the country. To determine the expropriation risk in equilibrium, we have
assumed that a ruling elite shapes national institutions to maximize its own
expected income. The institutional quality in this setting results from a
trade-o for the elite: On the one hand, weak institutions provide the elite
with better opportunities to seize productive assets from the private sector
and, thereby, raise the expected share of output that the elite can capture.
On the other hand, an increase in the risk of expropriation lowers the volume
of capital invested in the country and thereby reduces output.
In our model, a better integration of the capital importing country into
the world economy can be reected by a decline in xed investment costs.
We have shown that the impact of such a development on the institutional
quality critically depends on which type of xed costs decreases. If the bar-
riers for setting up an integrated rm in the host country decline, the elite
improves the institutional quality in the host country and more investors
choose the mode of integrated production. If, however, the specic costs of
setting up a joint venture decline, for example, because contracting with lo-
cal rms becomes easier, the institutional quality in the country deteriorates.
This asymmetric eect of a change in investment costs oers an interesting
hypothesis for an empirical analysis. It is also important from a policy point
of view: Measures to improve the institutional quality in certain countries
should therefore focus on supporting FDI instead of joint ventures.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we prove the comparative static results presented in section
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(1   )( +    )
< 0 :
Taking total total derivatives of (32), and provided that the second order
condition (SOC < 0) is satised, we obtain the following results:










































Dening ^ fi  dfi=fi and ^ fj  dfj=fj and inserting the rst order con-





SOC (fi   fj)

^ fi   ^ fj

:
The expropriation risk  therefore decreases if and only if ^ fi < ^ fj.





















since the term in squared brackets is equivalent to the rst order con-
dition (32).
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